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  In this paper we compare a traditional demand oriented model to a non-traditional 
capital budgeting model of bank lending based on movements in the equity cost of capital 
for France, Germany, and the Euro area.  Using non-nested hypothesis tests and omitted 
variables tests, we find that we reject the traditional demand oriented model of bank 
lending and fail to reject the capital budgeting model of bank lending for Monetary 
Financial Institutions in France and the Euro area.  For Germany the results are 
inconclusive.  Even though Europe is a bank-based financial system, it appears the stock 
market plays a key role in the lending decisions of banks. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
         
   Banks as financial intermediaries play an important role in the financial system and the 
real economy.  As the institution whose deposit liabilities represent an important component of 
the medium of exchange, they are well-positioned to reduce the information asymmetries that 
naturally arise in the transfer of resources from household savers to investing firms in a 
decentralized market economy.  There exists a large amount of cross-sectional empirical research 
on this subject that documents the importance of bank screening and monitoring of small firms 
where the real investments and investment returns are particularly opaque.
1  Moreover the 
benefits of bank screening and monitoring go beyond small firms.  Large firms having access to 
external capital markets also benefit from bank screening and monitoring.  When a bank grants a 
new loan or extends an existing loan to a firm, that piece of information sends a strong signal to 
the capital market that is reflected in the market valuation of the firm’s outstanding securities.
2 
In addition to allocating financial resources across firms in different sectors in the 
economy at a point in time, there is another important question concerning the role aggregate 
bank lending plays in the supply of finance over time.  More particularly, does bank lending over 
time amplify or dampen fluctuations in real economic activity?   Theoretical and empirical work 
in this area suggests that bank lending amplifies the business cycle.
3   The world-wide financial 
and economic crisis of 2007-2009 is but the most recent case study supporting this view.  This 
being the case it is important to ask the question: What determines bank lending over time and 
why does it amplify business fluctuations?  In order to formulate sensible government 
regulations for the banking sector as well as central bank policy it will be necessary to answer 
those questions.  The objective of this paper is to provide some evidence on one of the above 
questions, namely, the determinants of inter-temporal bank lending in Europe.     
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To be more specific, this paper compares two reduced-form specifications for MFI 
(monetary financial institutions) investments in private loans in France, Germany, and the entire 
Euro area when data availability permits.  The terms monetary financial institutions or MFI’s 
(defined in the Appendix on Data Sources) and banks will be used interchangeably when there is 
no confusion in the meaning.  One specification takes the view that MFI or bank lending is an 
investment decision, and like all investment decisions it must meet a cost of capital hurdle.  This 
view emphasizes the capital budgeting aspects of bank lending and the role of the market 
valuations of bank stocks reflecting the equity cost of capital for banks.
4   Other relevant factors 
(eg., expected cash flows from investment projects of firms and the wealth of bank loan 
customers) will be captured with the market valuations of stocks in general.  This specification 
takes the view that bank and non-bank share prices incorporate all the relevant information that 
is needed for the capital budgeting version of the bank lending decision.  Certain rare exogenous 
events like the reunification of Germany in 1990 and the 2001 attack on the financial district in 
New York City will be accommodated in the regression analysis with dummy variables.  The 
alternative and more conventional specification looks directly to the market for bank loans, and 
for institutional reasons peculiar to Europe focuses attention on the demand side of the market.  
This approach emphasizes the importance of such variables as a measure of aggregate income 
like GDP and the interest rate charged on bank loans.  This specification will also include 
dummy variables for the reunification of Germany in 1990 and the attack on the New York 
financial district in 2001.  We compare these two specifications of bank lending using non-
nested hypothesis tests and omitted variables tests.  The test results reported below indicate that 
the stock market-based capital budgeting hypothesis provides a better regression specification of 
MFI lending for France and the Euro area than the alternative specification based on indirect  
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measurements of supply and demand factors.  For Germany the evidence is somewhat less clear 
as to which hypothesis provides the better specification for MFI lending to the private sector in 
that both specifications seem to be rejected by the data.  However, for the commercial banking 
sector within the German MFI classification, it appears that the stock market hypothesis provides 
a better specification of lending than the traditional proxies for the supply and demand factors.  
These tests are presented in Section II.  Section III summarizes the results of this study.  
 
 
II.   Bank Lending in Europe  
 
A.  Two Models of Bank Lending 
 
     What determines the asset adjustments of firms?  When the assets are the real tangible assets 
of nonfinancial enterprises, economists tend to use capital budgeting rules such as the NPV or 
IRR rules that have firms compare the rate of return on the new real investment projects to the 
risk-adjusted cost of capital appropriate for the new investment projects.  When the asset 
adjustments are loans of banks, economists tend to use the supply/demand framework.  In this 
framework the quantity of bank loans and the interest rate on bank loans are simultaneously 
determined by the interaction of the factors influencing the supply of loans by banks and the 
factors influencing the demand for loans by borrowers.  Once the supply and demand factors are 
identified and the equilibrium condition specified, estimation can proceed.
5    One characteristic 
often associated with bank-based financial systems such as those in Europe and Japan is that 
there is a close and often long-term relationship between banks and their loan customers.  
Through this strong relationship bank loan officers come to know the economic environment and 
financial requirements of their loan customers, and loan customers in turn come to know the 
capacity of their banks to supply loan finance.  The end result of this close relationship is that  
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banks typically accommodate the informed loan requests of their customers.   For these reasons 
supply factors such as Basle type risk-based capital requirements, loan losses, changes in bank 
risk aversion, changes in credit standards, and changes in monetary policy are often argued (and 
empirically found) to play a relatively small role in determining the volume of new loans in 
bank-based financial systems.
6  Among other things this focus on the demand side of the loan 
market assumes that banks have a cushion of liquidity or wholesale borrowing capacity that can 
be utilized to accommodate the unexpected loan demands of their customers.  The primary 
determinants of bank lending in bank-based financial systems then comes from the demand side 
factors such as GDP (a proxy for business profitability and household income) and interest rates 
charged on loans (a proxy for the cost of loan finance).  Recent empirical work on demand 
oriented specifications of bank lending in Europe using VAR and VEC techniques include Calza, 
Gartner, and Sousa (2003), Eickmeir, Hofmann, and Worms (2006), Frommel and Schmidt 
(2006), and Sorensen, Ibanez, and Rossi (2009) among others.  In these demand oriented studies 
bank lending is typically described by the following parsimonious reduced-form linear 
specification.   
 
1)  ∆L= b0 + b1(GDP) + b2(R) + b3(DV,90/1) + b4(DV,2001/3,4) +e                                                                  
where 
 
∆L      = The real value of investment in private loans to firms and households by banks. 
 
GDP   = Real gross domestic product, a proxy for business and household income. 
 
R        = Real interest rate charged on bank loans, a proxy for the cost of loan finance. 
 
DV     = Dummy variables for the year and quarter indicated. 
 
e         = Random disturbance term. 
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The demand interpretation of bank lending in (1) specifies that b2 is negative.  However, 
theory does not exactly pin down the sign of b1.  The traditional argument is that b1 is positive 
reflecting the idea that higher incomes of firms and households imply a greater ability to service 
debt.  On the other hand Friedman and Kuttner (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Calza 
Manrique, and Sousa (2003) have argued that b1 could in principle be negative.  Their argument 
is that higher business and household incomes that accompany higher GDP could be used by 
financially conservative agents to pay down outstanding debt and increasingly finance the 
acquisition of goods, services, and assets from internally generated funds.  Similarly when 
business profits and household incomes as reflected in GDP fall, firms and households will 
borrow more from banks in order to smooth their expenditures on goods, services, and assets.  
However, the existing evidence clearly favors the traditional demand interpretation for b1>0 and 
b2<0.  
     The second specification of bank lending emphasizes the capital budgeting aspects of bank 
investments in private loans.  According to this view banks adjust their investments in loans in 
response to changes in the cash flows (or profitability) associated with the loans and their cost of 
capital.  The cash flows or profitability generated on the asset acquisitions of loan customers is 
proxied by general equity share prices and reflects the investment opportunities of firms and the 
wealth of households.
7   The cost of bank loan capital is proxied with bank equity share prices. 
We ignore the cost of deposit finance since it is practically zero.   The parsimonious reduced-
form linear specification for this stock market oriented view of bank lending is then given by: 
 




(SP,bk) = The real stock market valuation of bank equity shares.  
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(SP)      = The real stock market valuation of shares in general. 
 
DV       = Dummy variable for the year and quarter indicated. 
 
U          = Random disturbance term. 
 
The prediction from the capital budgeting theory of bank lending is that a1 and a2 are positive.   
 
To sum up we have two non-nested hypotheses H1 and H2 on the linear regression 
specification for bank investments in private loans.  They are: 
 
H1          ∆L = a0 + a1(SP,bk) + a2(SP) + a3(DV,90/1) + a4(DV,2001/3,4) + u    a1>0   a2>0 
                                                                                                        a3 and b3>0   a4 and b4<0                                     
 
H2          ∆L = b0 + b1(GDP) + b2(R) + b3(DV,90/1) +b4(DV,2001/3,4) + e       b1>0  b2<0                                     
 
Our objective for the rest of this section is to see which of the two specifications provides the 
better explanation of the data on MFI (and in addition, commercial banks in the case of 
Germany) investments in private loans for France, Germany and the Euro area. 
     Before beginning the empirical work it is important to note that even though Europe is usually 
characterized as a bank oriented financial system, there are important differences between the 
separate countries.  For example Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) report that bank assets relative 
to GDP are more than twice as large in Germany than in France (313 percent versus 147 
percent), and Germany has 3.9 banks per 100,000 people whereas France has only .6 banks per 
100,000 people.  The composition of bank assets and liabilities are also quite different between 
France and Germany.  In this connection Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1997) report that the loan to 
asset ratio is .656 in Germany whereas it is only .346 in France.  Similarly, the deposit to asset 
ratio is .428 in Germany and only .203 in France.  German banks appear to be more risky than 
French banks. These differences in the composition of MFI balance sheets might imply MFI 
lending in these two countries is not determined by the same set of explanatory variables.  There  
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are also data problems across the three geographical areas.  Euro area data before 1999 is mostly 
reconstructed from the original 11 countries (Greece was included after 2000).  The national 
contributions to Euro area data on GDP, interest rates, nominal loans, and the GDP deflator were 
aggregated up from the individual countries using the irrevocable fixed exchange rates at the end 
of 1998.  For a description of the aggregation method used see Calza, Manrique, and Sousa 
(2003).  Before 1990 Germany was two different countries.  The measures for stock prices, GDP, 
the producer price index, private loans, and the interest rate were for West Germany before 1990 
and for the united Germany after 1990.  The Appendix on Data Sources describes the data used 
in this study in more detail.       
 
 
B.  Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 presents the regression results for the two models of MFI/bank lending, 
Δ(L,MFI/banks), for France, Germany, and the Euro area.  The dependent variable is defined to 
be the change in the real stock of loans made to the private sector in those two countries and the 
Euro area.  For the H1 specification MFI/bank investments in real private loans depends on the 
real market value of bank equity shares, (SP,bk), and the real market value of shares in general, 
(SP).   The market value of bank shares reflects the cost of capital or required yield of bank 
shareholders.  It turned out that (SP,bk)
2 was also a significant statistical predictor of lending in 
France so that variable was also included in the H1 specification for that country to test for any 
nonlinearities in the relationship between lending and bank stock prices.  The second variable 
(SP) represents a capital market signal for the expected profitability and wealth of bank loan 
customers.  Since European banks (unlike U.S. banks) are allowed to hold equities in their 
portfolio, (SP) also captures a wealth effect that can influence the risk aversion of banks and the  
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supply of loan finance to the risky private sector.  The general stock market variables used in 
Table 1 are as follows: i) France, the real value of the SBF index of 250 French stocks traded on 
the Paris Bourse indicated in the regression as (SP,250); ii) Germany, the real value of the 
CDAX index of general stock prices indicated by (SP,CDAX); and finally, iii) the Euro area, the 
real value of the MSCI EU stock price index indicated in the regression as (SP,MSCI).  
Qualitatively similar results were obtained for the narrower CAC40 index for France and the 
DAX index for Germany.  For the demand oriented H2 specification of bank lending the 
explanatory variables include an economic activity variable (reflecting business revenues and 
household income) like real GDP, and a real interest rate variable, R, reflecting the cost of loan 
finance for business firms and households.  Outside shocks such as the reunification of Germany 
and the attack on the financial district in New York will be incorporated in both regression 
specifications with the following dummy variables, (DV,90/1) and (DV,2001/3,4) but only when 
these shocks have a statistically significant effect on bank lending.  The expected signs on these 
dummy variables is positive for (DV,90/1) and negative for (DV,2001/3,4). 
     The next question is whether the explanatory variables from these two specifications of bank 
lending are measured as levels or first differences.  A related question is whether these 
explanatory variables are contemporaneous with Δ(L,MFI/banks) or lagged.  If they are lagged, 
how many quarters are they to be lagged?  Theory provides little guidance on this question.  The 
following sample specific strategy will be used throughout this study to answer these questions 
of regression specification.  Whether an explanatory variable is expressed as a level or a first 
difference along with the exact lag will be determined by a search for the “best” OLS 
specification of the two competing hypotheses.  The “best” in this sense is in terms of the 
predicted signs from the two underlying theories, the statistical significance of the estimated  
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coefficients, and the overall explanatory power of each specification as measured by the 
coefficient of determination.  This strategy is implemented in order to give the underlying 
theories associated with each of the two specifications the best possible chance to explain 
MFI/bank investments in private loans.  Using this criterion the best sets of explanatory variables 
for H1 are as follows. 
France MFI’s:          Δ(SP,bk)t-4,  Δ(SP,bk)t
2,  (SP,250)t, and (DV2001/3,4) 
German MFI’s:        Δ(SP,bk)t-2,  Δ(SP,CDAX)t, and (DV,90/1) 
German Banks:       Δ(SP,bk)t-2,  Δ(SP,CDAX)t, and (DV,90/1) 
Euro Area MFI’s:    (SP,bk)t-1,  Δ(SP,MSCI)t-1,  (DV,90/1),  and (DV,2001/3,4) 
For H2 the best sets of explanatory variables are the following. 
France MFI’s:           Δ(GDP)t,  (R,ST)t-4, and (DV,2001/3,4) 
German MFI’s:        Δ(GDP-GR)t,  Δ(R,Ave)t-3,  and (DV,90/1) 
German Banks:         (GDP-GR)t-2, Δ(R,Ave)t-3, and (DV,90/1) 
Euro Area MFI’s:     Δ(GDP)t-2,  (R,Loan)t-1,  (DV,90/1), and (DV,2001/3,4) 
     Table 1 presents the regression evidence on the determinants of bank lending in France (part 
A), Germany (part B), and the Euro area (part C).  The first two regressions in each part of the 
table reports the OLS results of this search for the best H1 and H2 specification of MFI/bank 
lending in France, Germany, and the Euro area.  The last two regressions report the results of a 
non-nested hypothesis test of H1 and H2.   
     In  part A of the table for France it can be seen in regression (1) that the estimated coefficients 
on Δ(SP,bk)t-4, (SPbk)
2
t, and (SP,250)t are all positive and statistically significant as predicted by 
the H1 hypothesis of MFI lending.  In addition the dummy variable (DV,2001/3,4) capturing the 
effect on bank lending resulting from the attack on the financial district in New York is negative  
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and statistically significant.
8  It should also be noted that the CUSUM plots of the recursive 
residual (not shown here) all lie within the critical 5 percent significance lines indicating that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables are stable 
over the sample period 1989/2-2006/4.  This regression fails to reject H1.   The regression in (2) 
of part A of the table presents the results for H2.   There it can be seen that the estimated 
coefficients on Δ(GDP)t, and the lagged interest rate variable (R,ST)t-4 are respectively positive 
and negative as predicted by H2, and both estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5 percent significance level.  In this regression (DV,2001/3,4) while negative is not 
statistically significant.  For this specification of MFI lending the CUSUM plot of recursive 
residuals also indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are 
stable over the sample period.  There is empirical support for both H1 and H2 in France.  A 
second way to compare H1 and H2 is to carry out the J-type of non-nested hypothesis test 
developed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981)(1993).  In this test we first run the regression in 
H2 and collect the fitted values of ΔL(H2).  In the second step these fitted values from ΔL(H2) 
are included as an explanatory in the regression H1.  If the estimated coefficient on the fitted 
values from ΔL(H2) is statistically significant, then reject H1; if not, then we cannot reject H1.  
This procedure is then repeated for H2 by running the regression in H1 and taking the fitted 
values ΔL(H1) and including them in the second step as an additional explanatory variable in the 
regression for H2.  If the estimated coefficient on the fitted values of ΔL(H1) is statistically 
significant, then reject H2; otherwise fail to reject H2.  When there are two non-nested 
hypotheses to be compared, four outcomes are possible: i) reject H2, and fail to reject H1;   ii) 
reject H1, and fail to reject H2; iii) reject both H1 and H2; and iv) fail to reject both H1 and H2.  
If both H1 and H2 are rejected as in (iii), then neither model is very useful in explaining MFI  
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lending.  If it is not possible to reject both H1 and H2 as in (iv), then the data is not rich enough 
to discriminate between the two contending models of MFI lending.  The results of the J-test for 
the two specifications of bank lending in France are presented in the 3
rd and 4
th regressions in 
part A.  There it can be seen that that the estimated coefficient on ΔL(H2) in regression H1 is not 
significantly different from zero whereas the estimated coefficient on ΔL(H1) in regression H2 is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance.  On the basis of the J-test and a 
significance level of 1 percent we can reject the H2 specification of MFI lending based on 
demand considerations, and fail to reject the H1 specification based on stock market valuations 
and the cost of capital.   
     Still another way to differentiate between H1 and H2 is to carry out an “omitted variables” 
test.  To do this we add the explanatory variables representing the demand for loans—i.e., 
Δ(GDP)t and (R,ST)t-4 in H2—to the stock market variables in H1 to get an unrestricted 
regression for the H1 specification.  It is then possible to see whether adding these two demand 
variables from H2 makes a significant contribution to explaining Δ(L,MFI) over and above the 
stock market variables from H1.  The Null hypothesis is that the additional two demand 
regressors are not jointly significant and therefore do not belong in the H1 specification.  The test 
for this is an F-statistic and an associated P-value.  The result for the H1 specification is as 
follows; when adding Δ(GDP)t and (R,ST)t-4 to H1, the F-statistic is 1.80 and the P-value is .17.  
Accordingly we fail to reject the Null at the 5 percent level of significance indicating that GDP 
and the lagged interest rate on short-term bank loans are not omitted variables from the H1 stock 
market specification of MFI lending in France.  On the other hand when Δ(SP,bk)t-4, (SP,bk)t
2,  
and (SP,250)t from the H1 specification of MFI lending are added to the H2 demand 
specification, we can easily reject the Null that the additional stock market variables are not  
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omitted variables.  The F-statistic (and P-value) for this unrestricted specification for H2 are 
7.68(.00).  The omitted variable test like the J-test rejects the H2 specification of MFI lending in 
France but does not reject the H1 specification. 
                                                           Put Table 1 here 
     The statistical results for Germany are presented in part B of Table 1.  In the first two 
regressions we present the best OLS specification for the H1 and H2 model of MFI lending.  For 
H1 the regression specification makes Δ(L,MFI) depend on Δ(SP,bk)t-2, and Δ(SP,CDAX)t, 
whereas for H2  Δ(L,MFI) depends on Δ(GDP-GR)t and Δ(R,Ave)t-3.  For Germany we add the 
dummy variable (DV,90/1) to account for the reunification of the country.  The shock of 
September 2001 did not have a statistically significant effect on MFI lending so it was not 
included in the regression specification.  The sample period is from 1974/1-2006/4.  The first 
thing to note is that for both specifications of MFI lending there was a severe problem of first-
order serial correlation in the residuals.  To overcome this problem we implemented a Cochrane-
Orcutt procedure that transforms the data in H1 and H2 with an AR(1) process.  The cost of 
correcting the serial correlation problem with this AR(1) process is that we will not be able to 
use the CUSUM diagnostic to test for the inter-temporal stability of the estimated coefficients or 
carry out an omitted variables test on the two specifications of MFI lending.  In any event for the 
variables of interest in the H1 specification it can be seen in regression (1) that the estimated 
coefficients on Δ(SP,bk)t-2  and Δ(SP,CDAX) are both positive, and the Newey-West calculated    
t-statistics indicate that both estimated coefficients are statistically significant.  It is also the case 
that the positive estimated coefficient on (DV,90/1) is statistically significant.  These results are 
consistent with the stock market oriented theory of MFI lending.  We had more difficulty 
verifying the H2 specification in regression (2).  The estimated coefficient on Δ(GDP-GR)t while  
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positive (as predicted by the demand oriented theory) is only statistically significant at the 13 
percent level.  The estimated coefficient on Δ(R,Ave)t-3 is negative and statistically significant.  
At this point the best OLS evidence for H2 seems less strong than the evidence for H1.  To 
analyze this further we carried out the J-form of the non-nested hypothesis test in the third and 
fourth regression in part B of the table.  The results of this test presented in regressions (3) and 
(4) are that we end-up rejecting both the H1 and H2 specifications for MFI lending in Germany.
9     
     Germany also has balance sheet data for the commercial bank component of the MFI sector.  
The commercial bank sector is the largest component of the MFI sector.  Accordingly we will 
carry-out our comparison between H1 and H2 on these banks.  The dependent variable is now 
the change in the stock of real commercial bank loans to the private sector, Δ(L,Banks).  For the 
H1 specification the explanatory variables are exactly the same as they were for German MFI’s.  
For the H2 specification the only different regressor is now (GDP-GR)t-2.  The results of the OLS 
tests are presented in regressions (5) and (6) in part B of the table.  The first thing to note is that 
the Durbin-Watson statistics for both regressions indicate an absence of first-order serial 
correlation in the residuals and consequently no Cochrane-Orcutt transformation is applied to the 
data.  The second thing to note is that the estimated coefficients, Newey-West t-scores, and the 
coefficients of determination are all smaller for the commercial bank sector of bank lending than 
the MFI formulation reported above.  In (5) the estimated coefficients on the two stock market 
variables are again positive and statistically significant as predicted by H1.  In (6) the estimated 
coefficient on (GDP-GR)t-2 is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level while 
Δ(R,Ave)t-3 is negative and significant at the 11 percent level.  The OLS evidence seems stronger 
for H1 than H2.  The CUSUM test for both H1 and H2 indicates that the cumulative sum of the 
recursive residuals are within the 5 percent critical boundaries (although the residuals for H2  
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creep along the lower boundary) indicating that the estimated parameters are stable over the 
sample period.  Finally, the results of the non-nested hypothesis test for H1 and H2 are presented 
in regressions (7) and (8).  There it can be seen that H1 is not rejected when the computed values 
from Δ(L,H2) are included as an additional regressor in the H1 regression.  On the other hand H2 
is rejected when Δ(L,H1) is included as an additional explanatory variable in the H2 regression.  
On this criterion the H1 specification of bank lending has more support from the data than the 
H2 specification. 
     A further comparison of H1 and H2 can be obtained by carrying out an omitted variable test.  
To test the H1 specification we add the explanatory variables (GDP-GR)t-2 and Δ(R,Ave)t-3 from 
H2 to get an unrestricted regression for the H1 specification.  The resulting F-statistic (P-value) 
is 1.35(.26).  We therefore reject at the 5 percent level the hypothesis that these measures of 
income and interest rates are omitted variables in the H1 specification.  On the other hand when 
the two stock market variables from H1 are included in the H2 specification the F-statistic is 
10.06 and the P-value is .00 indicating that Δ(SP,bk)t-2 and Δ(SP,CDAX)t are omitted variables 
from the H2 specification of bank lending. 
   Up to this point we have compared two non-nested hypotheses of MFI/bank lending on two 
large economies in the Euro area, France and Germany.  Now with the somewhat limited data 
available we will look at the entire Euro area for the sample period 1988/3-2006/2.  The results 
of the regression tests (including dummy variables for both the reunification of Germany in 1990 
and the attack on New York in 2001) are presented in part C of Table 1.  The results for the first 
step OLS specification search are presented in regressions (1) and (2).  There it can be seen that 
the regression results provide support for both hypotheses of MFI/bank lending.  For H1 the 
estimated coefficient on lagged real bank share prices, (SP,bk)t-1, is positive and statistically  
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significant.  Similarly, the estimated coefficient on share prices in general, Δ(SP,MSCI)t-1, is also 
positive and statistically significant.  These results are consistent with the theory underlying H1.  
The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates an absence of first-order serial correlation in the residuals 
and the CUSUM test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients 
are stable over the sample period 1988/3-2006/2.  The same is more or less true for H2 in 
regression 2.  The estimated coefficient on Δ(GDP)t-1 is positive while the estimated coefficient 
on (R,loans)t-1 is negative.  Both estimates are statistically significant and both are consistent 
with the demand oriented theory underlying H2.  Moreover as was the case for H1 the Durbin-
Watson statistic indicates an absence of first-order serial correlation in the residuals, and the 
CUSUM plot of the recursive residuals all lie within the 5 percent upper and lower boundaries 
indicating that the estimated coefficients are stable over the entire sample time period. 
     To distinguish between these two hypotheses of bank lending with their very different 
implications for monetary policy we again implement the J-test version of the non-nested 
hypothesis test.  The results are presented in regressions (3) and (4) of Table 1.  In (3) we include 
the fitted values from the regression for H2 (i.e., Δ(L,H2)) as an explanatory variable in the 
regression H1.  As can be seen the estimated coefficient on Δ(L,H2) is not significantly different 
from zero.  We therefore reject H2.  Next this procedure is reversed by including in regression 
H2 the computed values of Δ(L,H1).  As can be seen the estimated coefficient on Δ(L,H1) in (4) 
is close to unity and statistically significant.  We therefore reject the specification of MFI lending 
in H2.  To further confirm this we carry out an omitted variable test.  To do this we add Δ(GDP)t-
2 and (R,Loan)t-1 to the regression specification in H1.  The F-statistic generated by this test is 
1.04 with a P-value of .36.  We therefore reject at the 5 percent level the hypothesis that these 
two demand variables are omitted variables from the capital budgeting/stock market hypothesis  
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of bank lending given in H1.  On the other hand adding (SP,bk)t-1 and Δ(SP,MSCI)t-1 to H2 
yields an F-statistic of 10.83 and a P-value of .00 indicating that these two stock market variables 
are omitted variables from the demand-oriented specification of bank lending in H2.  These 
results for the omitted variables test reinforce the results obtained in the J-test presented in part C 
of Table 1.  Our empirical work suggests that for the entire Euro area the capital budgeting/stock 
market specification of bank lending in H1 does a better job tracking MFI investments in private 
loans over the 1988/3 to 2006/2 time period than the more traditional demand factors. 
     Before concluding the empirical work on the determinants of MFI/bank lending in Europe, it 
would be useful to consider other possible explanatory variables not particularly related to either 
the H1 or H2 models of lending.  One such variable suggested in the literature is the equity 
leverage ratio of banks given the prominent role it plays in the Basle Accord on risk-based 
capital requirements.  The argument is that loans to the private sector are risky and that a 
prudently regulated/managed bank should be well capitalized with equity finance in order to 
absorb possible losses associated with investments in risky loans.  To test this proposition we 
will add an equity leverage ratio variable to the H1 and H2 specification of MFI/bank lending.  
The prediction from this line of reasoning is that the sign of the estimated coefficient on the 
equity leverage variable should be positive and statistically significant.  In choosing this equity 
variable we will again use the sample specific strategy used above in letting the data determine 
the choice.  The starting point is that the sign of the coefficient on this equity leverage variable 
must be positive.  The best result from this perspective defined the variable to be the lagged 
change in the ratio of equity capital to total assets.  For France it was a two quarter lag, 
Δ(Equity/A)t-2 ; whereas for Germany it was a one quarter lag, Δ(Equity/A)t-1.  At this point in  
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time there is no Euro measure of MFI equity or total MFI assets.  For this reason no results are 
reported for the Euro area.  The regression results for this test are presented in Table 2. 
                                                              (Put Table 2 here) 
     An examination of regressions (1) and (2) in part A of the table indicate that for France the 
addition of Δ(Equity/A)t-2 adds little to explaining MFI investments in private loans for either the 
H1 or H2 specifications.  While the estimated coefficient on the equity variable is positive it is 
never significantly different from zero.  Moreover the estimated coefficients on Δ(SP,bk)t-4, 
(SP,bk)
2
t, (SP,250)t, Δ(GDP)t, and (R,ST)t-4 were virtually unaffected by the inclusion of the 
equity variable.  In part B of the table we present the regression results of adding Δ(Equity/A)t-1 
to the H1 and H2 specifications of MFI and commercial bank lending in Germany.  The results 
here are quite different than they were for France.  For the most part the lagged marginal equity 
leverage ratio variable is a statistically significant predictor of lending by financial institutions in 
Germany.
10  Is this to be expected?  In II A above it was noted that the French and German 
banking systems were quite different in terms of asset allocations and financing.  In this 
connection French MFI’s have both a smaller proportion of their assets invested in risky loans to 
the private sector compared to Germany (an average of 42.6 percent versus 61.6 percent) and a 
thicker equity cushion (an average of 8.9 percent of total assets versus 3.9 percent) over their 
respective sample periods.  From this perspective German MFI’s seem to be carrying more 
portfolio risk and financial risk than French MFI’s thus necessitating German financial 
institutions to more closely link their investments in risky private loans to the change in their 












In this study we compare two hypotheses on the determinants of inter-temporal bank 
lending in France, Germany, and the combined Euro area.  The traditional view of bank lending 
in Europe focuses attention on the demand for loans by bank loan customers.  This traditional 
view is presented in the H2 reduced form specification of bank lending where these demand 
variables are proxied with GDP and various measures of short-term interest rates on bank loans.  
The policy implication of H2 is one where the monetary authority targets short-term interest rates 
in their attempt to stabilize aggregate demand.  Previous empirical studies and the ones carried 
out here were for the most part unable to reject the H2 specification of bank lending in Europe 
when that was the only hypothesis on the table.  This paper proposed an alternative hypothesis of 
bank lending based on capital budgeting theory and stock market valuations, and then proceeded 
to compare it to the more traditional H2 hypothesis.  The view taken here was that bank 
investments in private loans, like investments in any asset undertaken by firms in general, have 
to meet a cost of capital hurdle.  That cost of capital hurdle in this paper was approximated by 
the market valuation of bank equity shares.  Moreover banks in Europe hold equity securities in 
their portfolios.  For that reason we also included as an explanatory variable the market valuation 
of equity securities in general since changes in the market valuations of these securities can have 
a wealth affect on the willingness of European banks to supply loan finance to their customers.  
A complimentary interpretation for the inclusion of an index of general stock prices is that 
changes in general stock valuations reflect changes in expected cash flows and the profitability  
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of bank loan customers thereby affecting their demand for assets and ultimately the financing of 
those assets.  The reduced-form of this stock market/capital budgeting hypothesis was labeled 
H1.  These two hypotheses were then compared using non-nested hypothesis and omitted 
variables tests.  For the most part these tests  indicated that we were able to reject the more 
traditional demand oriented bank lending hypothesis in H2, but unable to reject the stock 
market/capital budgeting view of bank lending in H1.  Omitted variables tests reinforced this 
conclusion.  GDP and interest rates on loans were found not to be omitted variables in the H1 
specification of bank lending, but share valuations were found to be omitted variables in the H2 
specification.  Of course this is not to say that there is not some potential third hypothesis H3 of 
bank investments in private loans that could beat H1.  Whether that potential H3 would be 
devoid of an important role for equity prices is problematic.  One potential H3 examined in this 
paper was to include an equity leverage variable, ∆(Equity/A), to both the H1 and H2 
specifications.  The reason for adding an equity leverage variable is that these ratios are now part 
of the regulatory background within which banks operate.  The results of this experiment were 
interesting.  For France the addition of this explanatory variable in the OLS specifications of H1 
and H2 had no material effect on bank investments in private loans.  For Germany the case was 
quite different in that the addition of this equity leverage variable did effect bank lending in both 
H1 and H2.  Bank lending in Table 2 was shown to be positively related to ∆(Equity/A)t-1, and 
that positive relationship was statistically significant.  One possible reason for the difference 
between France and Germany is that French banks were observed to have more conservative 
portfolios (i.e., a smaller proportion of their assets invested in risky loans) and were more heavily 
capitalized with equity finance than their German counterparts.  For France the regulatory equity 
leverage constraint is less binding than was the case in Germany.          
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     In closing there has been much research indicating that there are important differences 
between the financial systems in Europe and the U.S., and the way corporate investments are 
financed in those countries.  The former is classified by this research as a bank-based financial 
system and the latter a stock market oriented financial system.  In both systems capital budgeting 
theory tells us that real corporate investment should respond to changes in expected real 
corporate cash flows and the cost of capital.  The job of the public corporation is to generate a 
rate of return on their assets that is at least equal to the required rate of return of their investors.  
It should be no different for banks.  It would therefore seem that if capital budgeting rules can 
evaluate the merits of tangible investments, they should be able to evaluate the merits of bank 
investments in private loans.  Under these conditions bank lending should then respond to both 
changes in the market valuations of bank stock, reflecting their cost of capital, and the market 
value of stocks in general reflecting the change in wealth and expected cash flows on real 
investment projects of bank loan customers.  Our research indicates that the banks in Europe are 
in fact guided by the stock market when it comes to determining their investments in private 
loans.  In this sense it might be said that Europe is also a stock market oriented financial system.  
What implications, if any, might this have for the conduct of monetary policy?  Traditional 
monetary policy targets the short-term interest rate (the same interest rate as in H2) which with a 
lag affects the demand for loans by bank customers and their demand for output.  This is the so-
called bank lending channel that describes the conventional view on the link between bank 
lending and the real economy.  Our research indicates that share valuations have a more powerful 
effect on bank lending than short-term interest rates.  If fluctuations in bank lending amplifies the 
demand for output and hence business cycles, then perhaps central banks might want to consider  
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carrying out some open market operations in equities with the view of stabilizing share prices.  
This is an area that merits future theoretical and empirical research.     






1.  A small sample of this research would include Berger and Udell (1993, 1995, and 1996), 
Nakamura (!993), Peterson and Rajan (1994), Berger and Humphrey (1998), and the 
special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance on the Economics of Small Business 
Finance edited by Berger and Udell (1998). 
 
2.  Early empirical research on the stock market value of nonfinancial firms of a bank 
relationship includes James (1987), Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1988), James and Wier 
(1990), Slovin and Young (1990), and Hirshey, Slovin, and Zaima (1990).  For more 
recent research see Ongena, Roscovan, and Werker (2007). 
 
3.  Procyclicality of bank lending has long been observed in the banking literature.  The 
reasons cited for this behavior include regulatory factors such as various versions of the 
Basle Accord and numerous non-regulatory factors.  A partial listing of the former would 
include Bernanke and Lown (1991), Lang and Nakamura (1995), Berger and Udell 
(1994), Hancock and Wilcox (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1995), Shrieves and Dahl 
(1995), Stanton (1998), Wagster (1999), Borio et al. (2001), Estrella (2004), Pennacchi 
(2005), and Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2005).  A partial listing of the non-regulatory causes 
would include Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Rajan (1994), Bernanke et al. 1996, Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997), Berger et al. (2001), Berger and Udell (2003), Gorton and He (2003), 
Krainer (2009), and Abiad et al.(2009). 
 
4.  The capital budgeting approach was found to be successful in an empirical study of U.S. 
bank portfolio adjustments by Krainer (2009).   
 
5.  For an early attempt of estimation in this direction see Krainer (1969). 
 
6.  Evidence for this in Germany during the 2007-2009 financial crisis is provided by Kooths 
and Rieger (2009) where they point out that while German banks suffered large losses 
from U.S. subprime securities, bank loans actually rose to accommodate their customers. 
Furthermore interest rates on loans were more or less constant over this time period.  
 
7.  A change in general share prices could also have a balance sheet/ wealth affect on bank 
lending since European banks hold equities in their portfolios. 
 
8.  Curiously the reunification of Germany had no material effect on French MFI lending to 
the private sector.  For that reason no dummy variable was included in the regression for 
that year. 
 
9.  An alternative strategy to implementing a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to address the serial 
correlation problem in regressions 1 and 2 for Germany is to instead include a lagged value 
of the dependent variable as a regressor.  The interpretation of the coefficient on this 
regressor would be a measure of the speed of adjustment in MFI loans from an old to a new  
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equilibrium value.   The J-test results for this alternative specification turned out to be the 
same as those reported in part B of Table 2; namely, we rejected both H1 and H2. 
 
10. We also carried out a non-nested hypothesis test for both the change in MFI loans and the            
commercial bank sector loans using the two specifications in part B of Table 2.  The results 
were the same as those presented in part B of Table 1.  For MFI’s the t-statistics/P-values on 
the estimated coefficients for ∆(L,H2) is 6.15/.00, and for ∆(L,H1) they are 9.39/.00.  We 
therefore reject both the H1 and H2 specifications for MFI lending which was the same result 
we obtained in part B of Table 1.  For the commercial banking sector the t-statistics/P-values 
on the estimated coefficients for ∆(L,H2) is 1.24/.22 while for ∆(L,H1) it is 4.47/.00.  As in 
part B (regressions 5-8) of Table 1 we therefore fail to reject the H1 specification of bank 
lending, but reject the H2 specification for the commercial banking sector. 
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MFI= Monetary financial institutions excluding the Banque de France and mutual funds.  MFI’s 
include resident credit institutions and other resident credit institutions that issue deposits and/or 
close substitutes, and grant credit and/or make investments in securities. 
 
(L,MFI)= The stock of MFI loans outstanding to euro area residents.  This variable is deflated by 
the French consumer price index.  Source: Banque de France.  Pre-1999 data converted into 
euros at the fixed irrevocable exchange rate between French francs and euros. 
 
(Equity)= The total stock of equity capital and reserves of French MFI’s.  Source: Banque de 
France.  Pre-1999 data converted at the fixed irrevocable exchange rate between French francs 
and euros. 
 
A= The stock of total assets of MFI’s in France.  Source: Banque de France.  Pre-1999 data 
converted at the fixed irrevocable exchange rate between French francs and euros. 
 
(SP,bk)= Quarterly index of French bank share prices deflated by the consumer price index in 
France.  Source: Datastream, Code: SBFNNKZ. 
 
(SP,250)= Quarterly index of general share prices of 250 stocks traded on the Paris bourse.  This 
stock series was deflated by the consumer price index in France.  Source: Datastream, Code: 
FSBF250. 
 
(GDP)= Real gross domestic product in France.  Nominal GDP was deflated by the consumer 
price index for France.  Source: Banque de France. 
 
(R,LT)= Real interest rate on medium to long-term loans to business.  The nominal interest rate 
was deflated by the percentage rate of change in the French consumer price index.  Monthly rates 
were averaged to obtain quarterly rates.  Source: Banque de France, Business Conditions 
Division. 
 
(R,ST)= Real interest rate on overdraft facilities.  The nominal rate was deflated by the 
percentage rate of change in the French consumer price index.  Monthly rates were averaged to 
obtain quarterly rates.  Source: Banque de France, Business Conditions Division. 
 
(R,T-Bill)= Real interest rate on French T-bills.  The Nominal rate was deflated by the 
percentage rate of change in the French consumer price index.  Monthly rates were averaged to 








MFI= Monetary financial institutions excluding the Deutsche Bundesbank and mutual funds.  
These are financial institutions that issue deposits or close substitutes for deposits, and grant 
credit and/or make investments in securities. 
 
(L,MFI)= The stock of MFI loans outstanding to non-MFI borrowers.  This variable is deflated 
by the German producer price index (2000=100) seasonally adjusted.  Source: Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Time series key OU0083.  Pre-1999 data converted at the fixed irrevocable 
exchange rate between DM’s and euros.   
 
(L,Banks)= The stock of commercial bank loans outstanding to non-MFI borrowers. This 
variable is deflated by the German producer price index seasonally adjusted.  Commercial banks 
comprise the sub-group of big banks, regional banks, other commercial banks, and branches of 
foreign banks.  Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Time series key OU0783.  Pre-1999 data 
converted at the fixed irrevocable exchange rate between DM’s and euros. 
 
(A,MFI)= The stock of total assets of MFI’s.  Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Time series key: 
OU0308.  Pre-1999 data converted at the fixed irrevocable exchange rate between DM’s and 
euros. 
 
(A,Banks)= The stock of total assets of commercial banks.  Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Time 
series key: OU0749.  Pre-1999 data converted at the fixed irrevocable exchange rate between 
DM’s and euros. 
 
(Equity)= Total equity capital.  For MFI’s this variable was obtained from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, time series key OU0322.  For commercial banks this variable was obtained from 
the Deutsche Bundesbank, time series key OU1543.  Pre-1999 data converted at the fixed 
irrevocable exchange rates between DM’s and euros. 
 
(SP,bk)= Quarterly index of large German bank share prices deflated by the German producer 
price index.  Source: Datastream, DS banks, Code BANKSBD (PI). 
 
(SP,CDAX)= The CDAX stock price index of all ordinary and preference shares officially listed 
on the Frankfurt stock exchange of companies domiciled in Germany.  The series is deflated by 
the German producer price index.  Source: Deutsche Bundesbank S 300, Time series key WU 
001a. 
 
(GDP-GR)= The percentage quarter to quarter change in the chain linked index of real GDP in 
Germany.  For 1974-1990 the data was for West Germany.  For 1991-2006 the data was for the 
unified Germany.  Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Time series key jbb000. 
 
(R,Ave)= The average yield on German debt securities of all maturities.  Monthly data were 
averaged to obtain quarterly data.  The average yields were deflated by the percentage change in 





MFI= Monetary institutions excluding central banks and mutual funds in the Euro area.  MFI’s 
include resident credit institutions and other financial institutions that issue deposits and/or close 
substitutes, and grant credit and/or make investments in securities. 
 
(L,MFI)= The stock of MFI loans outstanding to  Euro area residents deflated by the GDP 
deflator.  Source: ECB Monetary Statistics, October 2006, pp. 1C*-6C*. 
 
(SP,bk)= The quarterly stock price index of Euro area banks deflated by the Euro area GDP 
deflator.  Source: Datastream, EU-DS Banks; Code, BANKSEU. 
 
(SP,MSCI)= The quarterly MSCI European Union general stock price index deflated by the Euro 
area GDP deflator.  Source: Datastream. 
 
(R,loan)= The composite lending rate of banks in the original 11 Euro countries.  This lending 
rate was deflated by the GDP deflator for the Euro area.  Source: Unofficial data provided to the 
author by the European Central Bank. 
 
(GDP)= Real gross domestic product for the Euro area.  Source: Unofficial data provided to the 






Table 1:  Part A (FRANCE) 
Quarterly:  1989:2 to 2007:1 
 
 
1.  Δ(L,MFI)t = -1087.368 + 86.534Δ(SP,bk)t-4 + 0.312(SP,bk)
2
t + 236.254(SP,250) t – 1379.583(DV,2001/3,4)  H1 
            (-3.16/.00)    (3.28/.00)      (3.22/.00)          (3.91/.00)            (-3.37/.00) 
    R ¯ 
2 = 0.50      DW = 1.77 
 
2.  Δ(L,MFI)t = 2033.997 + 222.876Δ(GDP)t – 233.403(R,ST)t-4  –  460.237(DV,2001/3,4)     H2 
            (2.99/.00)   (2.02/.05)          (-3.40/.00               (-0.90/.37) 
    R ¯ 






3.  Δ(L,MFI)t = - 759.759 + 91.116Δ(SP,bk)t-4 + 0.239(SP,bk)
2
t + 130.883(SP,250)t – 815.110(DV,2001/3,4) + 0.446Δ(L,H2) 
          (-1.89/.06)   (3.45/.00)    (1.86/.07)         (1.26/.21)           (-1.08/.28)        (1.76/.08)             
 
4.  Δ(L,MFI)t = 155.637 + 125.103Δ(GDP)t – 37.603(R,ST)t-4 + 134.689(DV,2001/3,4) +0.862Δ(L,H1) 




Table 1:  Part B (GERMANY) 
Quarterly:  1974:1 to 2006:4 
 
1.  Δ(L,MFI)t = 17.318 + 0.253Δ(SP,bk)t-2 + 0.379Δ(SP,CDAX)t  +  106.047(DV,90)       H1 
          (3.85/.00) (3.56/.00)         (2.46/.02)                    (38.43/.00) 
     R ¯ 
2 = 0.36      DW = 2.20      AR(1) = 0.47 
 
2.  Δ(L,MFI)t = 17.468 + 1.385Δ(GDP - GR)t – 16.530Δ(R,Ave)t-3  +  95.423(DV,90)       H2 
          (3.71/.00) (1.53/.13)            (-2.75/.01)           (18.26/.00) 
     R ¯ 
2 = 0.32      DW = 2.20      AR(1) = 0.48 
             
J-Test Results 
 
3.  Δ(L,MFI)t = -4.768+ 0.175Δ(SP,bk)t-2 + 0.135Δ(SP,CDAX)t – 14.976(DV,90) + 1.229Δ(L,H2) 
          (-1.51/.13) (2.46/.02)       (1.27/.21)         (-.54/.59)           (8.43/.00) 
 
 
4.  Δ(L,MFI)t = -2.386 + 1.325Δ(GDP - GR)t – 9.850Δ(R,Ave)t-3 – 3.823(DV,90) + 1.094Δ(L,H1) 
           (-.73/.47)  (.72/.47)            (-2.16/.03)              (-.13/.90)           (7.37/.00) 
      
      Quarterly:  1973:4 to 2006:4 
 
5.  Δ(L,Banks)t = 4.180 + 0.132Δ(SP,bk)t-2 + 0.180Δ(SP,CDAX)t  +  83.077(DV,90)       H1 
          (3.60/.00) (2.91/.00)         (2.04/.04)          (70.42/.00) 
       R ¯ 
2 = 0.29      DW = 2.21 
 
6.  Δ(L,Banks)t = 3.553 + 2.119(GDP - GR)t -2– 2.665Δ(R,Ave)t-3  +  81.087(DV,90)       H2 
               (2.66/.01) (2.13/.04)    (-1.63/.11)         (52.23/.00) 
       R ¯ 
2 = 0.20      DW = 2.10 
 
     J-Test Results 
 
7.  Δ(L,Banks)t = -0.056 + 0.126Δ(SP,bk)t-2 + 0.184Δ(SP,CDAX)t + 8.402(DV,90) + 0.902Δ(L,H2) 
                             (-0.02/.99) (2.93/.00)          (2.97/.00)           (0.166/.87)         (1.53/.13) 
 
 
8.  Δ(L,Banks)t = -1.161 + 2.242(GDP - GR)t-2 – 1.089Δ(R,Ave)t-3 – 2.015(DV,90) + 1.004Δ(L,H1) 





Table 1:  Part C  (EURO AREA) 
Quarterly: 1988:3 to 2006:2 
 
 
1.  Δ(L,MFI)t = -32.109+ 0.136(SP,bk)t-1+ 0.445Δ(SP,MSCI)t-1+ 113.801(DV,90)– 47.671(DV,2001/3,4)      H1               
(-2.55/.01)  (6.43/.00)               (2.53/.01)            (23.11/.00)        (-2.22/.03) 
     R ¯ 
2 = 0.50      DW = 2.16 
 
 
2.  Δ(L,MFI)t = 135.808+ 0.002Δ(GDP)t-2 –12.690(R,Loan)t-1+ 114.567(DV,90)– 51.429(DV,2001/3,4)       H2 
                        (6.09/.00)    (2.22/.03)       (-4.99/.00)         (14.30/.00)      (-2.12/.04) 
     R ¯ 






3.  Δ(L,MFI)t=-22.264+0.107(SP,bk)t-1 +.418Δ(SP,MSCI)t-1+104.418(DV,90)–25.418(DV,2001/3,4)+ 0.065Δ(L,H2) 
          (-1.74/.08) (3.08/.00)             (1.99/.05)     (2.25/.03)            (-0.90/.37)          (0.23/.82) 
 
 
4.  Δ(L,MFI)t =-18.756+0.001Δ(GDP)t-2+1.344(R,Loan)t-1–12.009(DV,90)+3.472(DV,2001/3,4)+1.037Δ(L,H1) 







2 = Adjusted coefficient of determination. 
DW= Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Newey-West computed t-scores and p-values are given in the parentheses beneath the estimated coefficients.  
  34
 
    Table 2:  Part A (FRANCE) 
Quarterly: 1989:2 to 2007:1 
 






        (-3.16/.00)  (3.13/.00)            (3.28/.00)  (3.91/.00)      (-3.21/.00)               (.31/.76) 
     R ¯ 
2 = 0.50      DW = 1.78 




        (2.96/.00)    (2.01/.05)             (-3.40/.00)     (-0.73/.47)              (1.35/.18) 
     R ¯ 
2 = 0.31      DW = 1.60 
 
  Part B (GERMANY) 
Quarterly: 1974:3 to 2006:4 
 
1.  Δ(L,MFI)t = 17.521 + 0.234Δ(SP,bk)t-2 + 0.388Δ(SP,CDAX)t + 4188.863Δ(
A
Equity
)t-1 + 102.328(DV,90) 
                    (3.74/.00) (3.12/.00)        (2.42/.02)           (1.85/.07)             (39.12/.00) 
     R ¯ 
2 = 0.36      DW = 2.13      AR(1) = 0.50 
2.  Δ(L,MFI)t = 17.488 + 1.183Δ(GDP - GR)t – 17.127Δ(R,Ave)t-3 + 4726.387Δ(
A
Equity
)t-1 + 90.397(DV,90) 
        (3.46/.00) (1.44/.15)           (-2.71/.01)           (2.14/.03)     (18.82/.00) 
     R ¯ 
2 = 0.33      DW = 2.09      AR(1) = 0.53 
3.  Δ(L,Banks)t = 4.328 + 0.116 Δ(SP,bk)t-2 + 0.191Δ(SP,CDAX)t + 2051.596Δ(
A
Equity
)t-1 + 74.954(DV,90) 
          (3.65/.00) (2.66/.01)          (2.26/.03)          (2.70/.01)          (22.71/.00) 
     R ¯ 
2 = 0.34      DW = 1.99 
4.  Δ(L,Banks)t = 3.983 + 1.629(GDP - GR)t-2 – 2.308Δ(R,Ave)t-3 + 2039.889Δ(
A
Equity
)t-1 + 73.342(DV,90) 
          (2.91/.00) (1.68/.10)    (-1.41/.16)         (2.64/.01)     (22.71/.00) 
     R ¯ 




2 = Adjusted coefficient of determination. 
DW= Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Newey-West computed t-scores and p-values are given in the parentheses beneath the estimated coefficients.  